scientific article

Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor, Alvin E. Roth

Publication date: 17 September 1992

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

matching marriage problem firms-employees problem

Permutations, words, matrices (05A05) Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-01) Matching models (91B68)

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