Counting combinatorial choice rules
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Publication:876881
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.03.009zbMATH Open1168.91348OpenAlexW2126352844MaRDI QIDQ876881FDOQ876881
Authors: Federico Echenique
Publication date: 19 April 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-131625843
Recommendations
communication complexityindependence of irrelevant alternativeschoice rulessubstitutabilitymatching marketsrationalizabilty
Cites Work
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Cited In (14)
- A cumulative offer process for supply chain networks
- Complexity of stability in trading networks
- WARP and combinatorial choice
- A college admissions clearinghouse
- Resolutions of convex geometries
- Choice functions and extensive operators
- Set and revealed preference axioms for multi-valued choice
- The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
- Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
- Counting Multiple Cyclic Choices Without Adjacencies
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
- Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago
- Revealed VNM-solutions: characterizations
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