Choice function-based two-sided markets: stability, lattice property, path independence and algorithms

DOI10.3390/a7010032zbMath1461.91197OpenAlexW2001236072MaRDI QIDQ1736601

Zsuzsanna Jankó, Tamás Fleiner

Publication date: 26 March 2019

Published in: Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/a7010032

zbMATH Keywords

latticechoice functionstable matchingscollege admission

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Matching models (91B68) Lattices (06B99)

Related Items (6)

College admissions with stable score-limits ⋮ Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems ⋮ Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching ⋮ Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits ⋮ Editorial: Special issue on matching under preferences ⋮ College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach

Cites Work

• College admissions with stable score-limits
• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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