Choice function-based two-sided markets: stability, lattice property, path independence and algorithms

DOI10.3390/A7010032zbMATH Open1461.91197OpenAlexW2001236072MaRDI QIDQ1736601FDOQ1736601

Authors Tamás Fleiner, Zsuzsanna Jankó

Publication date 26 March 2019

Published in Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/a7010032

zbMATH Keywords

latticestable matchingschoice functioncollege admission

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Matching models (91B68) Lattices (06B99)

Recommendations

• On the Lattice Structure of Stable Allocations in a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market
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• Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
• Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
• Pairwise stability in a two-sided matching market with indivisible goods and money
• Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets

Cites work

• A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
• A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• College admissions with stable score-limits
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners

Cited in

(8)

• College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
• Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems
• On the Lattice Structure of Stable Allocations in a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market
• College admissions with stable score-limits
• Counting combinatorial choice rules
• Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching
• Editorial: Special issue on matching under preferences
• Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits

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