Choice function-based two-sided markets: stability, lattice property, path independence and algorithms
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Publication:1736601
DOI10.3390/A7010032zbMATH Open1461.91197OpenAlexW2001236072MaRDI QIDQ1736601FDOQ1736601
Authors: Tamás Fleiner, Zsuzsanna Jankó 
Publication date: 26 March 2019
Published in: Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/a7010032
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Cites Work
- A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- College admissions with stable score-limits
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
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- Counting combinatorial choice rules
- College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
- College admissions with stable score-limits
- Editorial: Special issue on matching under preferences
- Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits
- Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems
- On the Lattice Structure of Stable Allocations in a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market
- Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching
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