Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits
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Publication:1728163
DOI10.1016/j.orl.2017.01.001zbMath1409.91185OpenAlexW2576849598MaRDI QIDQ1728163
Publication date: 22 February 2019
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2324/4055204
Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Matching models (91B68)
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Cites Work
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