Preference profiles determining the proposals in the Gale-Shapley algorithm for stable matching problems
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Publication:1926654
DOI10.1007/s13160-012-0077-xzbMath1254.90198OpenAlexW1969990055MaRDI QIDQ1926654
Noriyoshi Sukegawa, Yoshitsugu Yamamoto
Publication date: 28 December 2012
Published in: Japan Journal of Industrial and Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13160-012-0077-x
rooted spanning treestable matchingmatroid intersectionpreference profileGale-Shapley algorithmstrategic manipulability
Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (3)
Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits ⋮ Three-sided stable matching problem with two of them as cooperative partners ⋮ Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm
Cites Work
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- Cheating strategies for the Gale-Shapley algorithm with complete preference lists
- Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications
- Efficient algorithms for a family of matroid intersection problems
- A PRIMAL APPROACH TO THE INDEPENDENT ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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