Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications
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Publication:3114728
DOI10.1287/mnsc.47.9.1252.9784zbMath1232.91536OpenAlexW2103588602MaRDI QIDQ3114728
Jay Sethuraman, Chung-Piaw Teo, Wee-Peng Tan
Publication date: 19 February 2012
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/04c6734c154486b3c73c8ae7c4c3cff88bba1d48
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