Bribery and control in stable marriage

DOI10.1613/JAIR.1.12755OpenAlexW3197398676WikidataQ130990430 ScholiaQ130990430MaRDI QIDQ5154751FDOQ5154751

Authors Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, Rolf Niedermeier

Publication date 5 October 2021

Published in Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.04948

zbMATH Keywords

game theorypreferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx)

Recommendations

• Bribery and control in stable marriage
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• Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences
• The stable marriage problem with master preference lists

Cites work

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• How hard is it to control an election?
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• Optimum branchings
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• Three Fast Algorithms for Four Problems in Stable Marriage

Cited in

(8)

• The complexity of matching games: a survey
• Preference swaps for the stable matching problem
• Bribery and control in stable marriage
• Total stability in stable matching games
• Some hard stable marriage problems: a survey on multivariate analysis
• Parameterized complexity of stable roommates with ties and incomplete lists through the lens of graph parameters
• Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
• Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems

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