Bribery and control in stable marriage
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Publication:5154751
DOI10.1613/JAIR.1.12755OpenAlexW3197398676WikidataQ130990430 ScholiaQ130990430MaRDI QIDQ5154751FDOQ5154751
Authors: Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, Rolf Niedermeier 
Publication date: 5 October 2021
Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.04948
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Cites Work
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Cited In (8)
- Parameterized complexity of stable roommates with ties and incomplete lists through the lens of graph parameters
- Bribery and control in stable marriage
- Preference swaps for the stable matching problem
- The complexity of matching games: a survey
- Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
- Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems
- Total stability in stable matching games
- Some hard stable marriage problems: a survey on multivariate analysis
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