Bribery and control in stable marriage

DOI10.1613/JAIR.1.12755OpenAlexW3197398676WikidataQ130990430 ScholiaQ130990430MaRDI QIDQ5154751FDOQ5154751

Authors: Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Klaus Heeger, Rolf Niedermeier 

Publication date: 5 October 2021

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.04948

Recommendations

• Bribery and control in stable marriage
• Total stability in stable matching games
• Hard variants of stable marriage.
• Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences
• The stable marriage problem with master preference lists

zbMATH Keywords

game theorypreferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx)

Cites Work

• Fundamentals of parameterized complexity
• Reducibility among Combinatorial Problems
• Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications
• Three Fast Algorithms for Four Problems in Stable Marriage
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Max flows in O(nm) time, or better
• Optimum branchings
• An $n^{5/2} $ Algorithm for Maximum Matchings in Bipartite Graphs
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• A Faster Deterministic Maximum Flow Algorithm
• Efficient algorithms for finding minimum spanning trees in undirected and directed graphs
• Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
• How hard is it to control an election?
• How hard is bribery in elections?
• Control and Bribery in Voting
• On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
• Hard variants of stable marriage.
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On a generalization of the stable roommates problem
• The stable marriage problem with ties and restricted edges
• A note on the uniqueness of stable marriage matching
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (6)

• Parameterized complexity of stable roommates with ties and incomplete lists through the lens of graph parameters
• Bribery and control in stable marriage
• Preference swaps for the stable matching problem
• The complexity of matching games: a survey
• Computing relaxations for the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences
• Manipulating the outcome of stable marriage and roommates problems

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