Recommendations
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 193519 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3376944 (Why is no real title available?)
- New directions in cryptography
- Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
- Recognizing majority-rule equilibrium in spatial voting games
- Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- The Theory of Round Robin Tournaments
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
Cited in
(81)- The complexity of probabilistic lobbying
- The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
- Parameterized complexity of voter control in multi-peaked elections
- Tennis manipulation: can we help Serena Williams win another tournament? Or can we control a knockout tournament with reasonable complexity?
- Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for \(d\)-approval elections
- Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems
- Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for \(d\)-approval elections
- Parameterized complexity of control by voter selection in Maximin, Copeland, Borda, Bucklin, and Approval election systems
- Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
- Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- Algorithms for gerrymandering over graphs
- Complexity of shift bribery for iterative voting rules
- Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota
- Computer science and decision theory
- The control complexity of \(r\)-Approval: from the single-peaked case to the general case
- Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers
- Vote trading in public elections
- Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
- Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
- NP-hardness of two edge cover generalizations with applications to control and bribery for approval voting
- The nonmanipulative vote-deficits of voting rules
- A parameterized perspective on protecting elections
- Normalized range voting broadly resists control
- Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
- Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
- Structural control in weighted voting games
- Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control
- The complexity of priced control in elections
- Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules
- Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Control of Condorcet voting: complexity and a relation-algebraic approach
- New candidates welcome! Possible winners with respect to the addition of new candidates
- Generalized juntas and NP-hard sets
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Challenges to complexity shields that are supposed to protect elections against manipulation and control: a survey
- Exploiting social influence to control elections based on positional scoring rules
- Solving hard control problems in voting systems via integer programming
- Binary linear programming solutions and non-approximability for control problems in voting systems
- Network-based vertex dissolution
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
- Complexity of and algorithms for the manipulation of Borda, Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules
- Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
- Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
- The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections
- Computational complexity of manipulation: a survey
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- Manipulation can be hard in tractable voting systems even for constant-sized coalitions
- Bribery and control in stable marriage
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6747953 (Why is no real title available?)
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: an experimental analysis
- Prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift bribery
- On the complexity of bribery and manipulation in tournaments with uncertain information
- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
- The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control
- Combinatorial voter control in elections
- The learnability of voting rules
- On the computational complexity of variants of combinatorial voter control in elections
- On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
- Mixed integer programming with convex/concave constraints: fixed-parameter tractability and applications to multicovering and voting
- The possible winner problem with uncertain weights revisited
- Resolute control: forbidding candidates from winning an election is hard
- The Complexity of Controlling Condorcet, Fallback, and k-Veto Elections by Replacing Candidates or Voters
- Priced gerrymandering
- Primarily about primaries
- Complexity of conformant election manipulation
- Collective decision making
- Isomorphic Distances Among Elections
- Complexity of manipulation and bribery in premise-based judgment aggregation with simple formulas
- Complexity of control in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
- Group control for consent rules with consecutive qualifications
- Duplication monotonicity in the allocation of indivisible goods
- Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
- Hotelling-Downs equilibria: moving beyond plurality variants
- Constraint-based electoral districting using a new compactness measure: an application to Portugal
- Controlling sub-tournaments: easy or hard problem? Theoretical vs. practical analysis
- The possible winner with uncertain weights problem
- Obtaining a proportional allocation by deleting items
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