Binary linear programming solutions and non-approximability for control problems in voting systems

DOI10.1016/J.DAM.2013.08.032MaRDI QIDQ741772zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Frank Gurski, Magnus Roos

Publication date 12 September 2014

Published in Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2013.08.032

zbMATH Keywords

approximationgraph algorithmsvotingcontrol problemscomputational social choicebinary linear programming formulationsdigraph modification problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20)

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1330033 (Why is no real title available?)
• 50 Years of Integer Programming 1958-2008
• Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
• Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
• Digraphs
• How hard is bribery in elections?
• How hard is it to control an election?
• Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
• Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
• On making a distinguished vertex minimum degree by vertex deletion
• Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
• Parametrized complexity theory.
• The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
• Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?

Cited in

(3)

• Solving hard control problems in voting systems via integer programming
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1163867 (Why is no real title available?)
• Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control

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