Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
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Publication:1029347
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2009.04.004zbMath1164.91004OpenAlexW1990416099MaRDI QIDQ1029347
Junfeng Luan, Haodi Feng, Daming Zhu, Hong Liu
Publication date: 10 July 2009
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2009.04.004
parameterized complexityCondorcet votingapproval votingplurality votingvoting systemsdestructive controlconstructive control
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