When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
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Publication:3546334
DOI10.1145/1236457.1236461zbMath1292.91062OpenAlexW1972375916MaRDI QIDQ3546334
Jérôme Lang, Tuomas W. Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer
Publication date: 21 December 2008
Published in: Journal of the ACM (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/1236457.1236461
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