A new perspective on implementation by voting trees
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Publication:5198671
DOI10.1002/rsa.20336zbMath1218.91039MaRDI QIDQ5198671
Ariel D. Procaccia, Felix Fischer, Alex Samorodnitsky
Publication date: 9 August 2011
Published in: Random Structures & Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/rsa.20336
91B12: Voting theory
60J20: Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.)
91B14: Social choice
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Cites Work
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