Choosing from a tournament
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1089228
DOI10.1007/BF00292732zbMath0618.90004MaRDI QIDQ1089228
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
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