Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2862zbMath1031.91023MaRDI QIDQ1599833

Matthew O. Jackson, Michel Le Breton, Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 27 February 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/b491053b0511785747b83ccd74337d20a8af8d4f

zbMATH Keywords

voting; successive elimination; candidacy game; strategic candidacy; tree and binary voting procedure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

Related Items

A theory of iterative choice in lists, A foundation for strategic agenda voting, Candidate stability and voting correspondences, Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency, Introduction to political science, The scoring rules in an endogenous election

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