Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control

Recommendations

Equitable agendas: Agendas ensuring identical sincere and sophisticated voting decisions
Majority tournaments: Sincere and sophisticated voting decisions under amendment procedure
Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
Sophisticated voting rules: The case of two tournaments
Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule

Cites work

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3303831 (Why is no real title available?)
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3200637 (Why is no real title available?)
Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models
General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
The Theory of Round Robin Tournaments

Cited in

(92)

Fuzzy social choice: a selective retrospect
Manipulative agendas in four-candidate elections
A topological characterization of the non-emptiness of the banks set and the uncovered set
A new perspective on implementation by voting trees
Social Choice Theory
Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
Formal versus informal legislative bargaining
FUZZY SETS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: AN OVERVIEW
Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
A social choice theory of legitimacy
Uncovered sets
Minimal extending sets in tournaments
Computing minimal extending sets by relation-algebraic modeling and development
A foundation for strategic agenda voting
Limits on agenda control in spatial voting games
Discrepancies in the outcomes resulting from different voting schemes
In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games
Minimal stable sets in tournaments
Jeffrey Scot Banks (1958--2000)
Simple games with many effective voters
Black and Farquharson on order-of-voting effects: An extension
Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
Sequential voting by veto: Making the Mueller-Moulin algorithm more versatile
The Banks Set and the Uncovered Set in Budget Allocation Problems
On fuzzy tournaments and their solution concepts in group decision making
Representative democracy and the implementation of majority-preferred alternatives
On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures
Voting procedures, complexity of
Column-wise extendible vector expressions and the relational computation of sets of sets
Improved bounds for minimal feedback vertex sets in tournaments
Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
A note on contestation-based tournament solutions
On the complexity of Slater's problems
The Borda count and agenda manipulation
Choosing from a large tournament
The uncovered set in spatial voting games
A survey on the complexity of tournament solutions
Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
On the difficulty of making social choices
Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees
Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
A \(7 / 3\)-approximation algorithm for feedback vertex set in tournaments via Sherali-Adams
Tight bounds on 3-team manipulations in randomized death match
Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
Rational stability of choice functions
Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
Computing and visualizing Banks sets of dominance relations using relation algebra and RelView
Alternate definitions of the uncovered set and their implications
On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules
An updated survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments
Feedback vertex sets in tournaments
Choosing from a tournament
A note on extended stable sets
Computing the minimal covering set
A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz
Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
How hard is it to control an election?
A theorem of voting rules and budget deficits
Individual choice under social influence
Maximum distance between Slater orders and Copeland orders of tournaments
Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule
The minimal covering set in large tournaments
The basic approval voting game
The Banks set in infinite spaces
On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
Representation in majority tournaments
Weak covering relations
Condorcet cycles? A model of intertemporal voting
A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
On the tournament equilibrium set
Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
A survey on the linear ordering problem for weighted or unweighted tournaments
A tournament of order 14 with disjoint Banks and Slater sets
Possible winner problems on partial tournaments: a parameterized study
Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting
Endogenous voting agendas
Equitable agendas: Agendas ensuring identical sincere and sophisticated voting decisions
The Copeland measure of Condorcet choice functions
A refinement of the uncovered set in tournaments
Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison
A 16-vertex tournament for which Banks set and Slater set are disjoint
The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
Parliamentary voting procedures: agenda control, manipulation, and uncertainty
Rank-based choice correspondences
An optimal algorithm to find champions of tournament graphs
A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set
Majority tournaments: Sincere and sophisticated voting decisions under amendment procedure
Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory
Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
A systematic approach to the construction of non-empty choice sets
Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions
Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule

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