Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
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Publication:1079463
DOI10.1007/BF00649265zbMATH Open0597.90011MaRDI QIDQ1079463FDOQ1079463
Authors: Jeffrey S. Banks 
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
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- Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
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