Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
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Publication:1017796
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.012zbMath1159.91356OpenAlexW1972980897MaRDI QIDQ1017796
Parimal Kanti Bag, Hamid Sabourian, Eyal Winter
Publication date: 12 May 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.012
scoring rulesCondorcet consistencyMarkov equilibriumsequential eliminationmulti-stage votingtop cycle
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