Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2008.11.012MaRDI QIDQ1017796zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Parimal Kanti Bag, Hamid Sabourian, Eyal Winter

Publication date 12 May 2009

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.11.012

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet consistencyMarkov equilibriummulti-stage votingscoring rulessequential eliminationtop cycle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings
• Approval voting: three examples
• Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome
• Complexity and Competition
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
• Implementing generalized Condorcet social choice functions via backward induction
• Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules
• Sequential voting with abstention
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
• Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?

Cited in

(10)

• Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
• Information aggregation with runoff voting
• On removing Condorcet effects from pairwise election tallies
• Sequential voting with abstention
• The basic approval voting game
• Manipulation complexity of same-system runoff elections
• SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS? A WELFARE ANALYSIS
• A foundation for strategic agenda voting
• Condorcet meets Bentham
• Preference domains and the monotonicity of Condorcet extensions

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