Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study

DOI10.1007/s00355-010-0448-7zbMath1232.91188OpenAlexW2068129224MaRDI QIDQ1959695

Nicolas Sauger, André Blais, Jean-François Laslier, Karine van der Straeten

Publication date: 7 October 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/2009/election_rules.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

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