Policy moderation and endogenous candidacy in approval voting elections
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Publication:2829691
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_18zbMATH Open1348.91094OpenAlexW3139676846MaRDI QIDQ2829691FDOQ2829691
Authors: Arnaud Dellis 
Publication date: 8 November 2016
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_18
Recommendations
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- Approval voting with endogenous candidates
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- Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting
- Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
- Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House
- Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- Approval voting with endogenous candidates
- Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
- Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
Cited In (5)
- Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
- Approval as an intrinsic part of preference
- Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting
- Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
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