Policy moderation and endogenous candidacy in approval voting elections
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Recommendations
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- Approval voting with endogenous candidates
- Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
- Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting
- Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization
Cites work
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- Approval voting with endogenous candidates
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2038875 (Why is no real title available?)
- Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
- Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
Cited in
(6)- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
- Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
- Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting
- Approval as an intrinsic part of preference
- Fair group decisions via non-deterministic proportional consensus
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