Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
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Publication:579096
DOI10.1007/BF00433944zbMath0624.90005WikidataQ57341019 ScholiaQ57341019MaRDI QIDQ579096
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
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