What shall we do with the cyclic profile?

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0596-4zbMATH Open1287.91053OpenAlexW1964572799MaRDI QIDQ2452147FDOQ2452147

Eivind Stensholt

Publication date: 30 May 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0596-4

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The probability of Condorcet cycles and super majority rules
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Voting Problem
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
• Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
• A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
• On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• Condorcet’s Paradox
• Parties as Political Intermediaries
• The strong no show paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences
• Smallest tournaments not realizable by \({\frac{2}{3}}\)-majority voting
• Circle Pictograms for Vote Vectors
• Voces populi and the art of listening

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