What shall we do with the cyclic profile?
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Publication:2452147
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
- Circle Pictograms for Vote Vectors
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- Condorcet’s Paradox
- Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
- Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
- Parties as Political Intermediaries
- Smallest tournaments not realizable by \({\frac{2}{3}}\)-majority voting
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The Voting Problem
- The probability of Condorcet cycles and super majority rules
- The strong no show paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences
- Voces populi and the art of listening
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