On the Theory of Strategic Voting1

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2007.00421.XMaRDI QIDQ5293374zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David P. Myatt

Publication date 2 July 2007

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00421.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(45)

• Manipulation through political endorsements
• Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence
• Strategic voting in repeated referenda
• Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting.
• Electoral competition with strategic voters
• Strategic vote trading under complete information
• \(|N|\) cheers for democracy
• Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
• Information aggregation with runoff voting
• Strategic voting when participation is costly
• Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
• The effect of handicaps on turnout for large electorates with an application to assessment voting
• Electoral institutions with impressionable voters
• The Italian referendum: what can we get from game theory?
• A theory of strategic voting with non-instrumental motives
• Pre-election polling and third party candidates
• Strategic voting and nomination
• A model of pre-electoral coalition formation
• Primaries with strategic voters: trading off electability and ideology
• Strategic voting in heterogeneous electorates: an experimental study
• Incomplete information, proportional representation and strategic voting
• What shall we do with the cyclic profile?
• Informational feedback between voting and speculative trading
• Voting in legislative elections under plurality rule
• Strategic voting under the plurality rule without the common knowledge assumption
• Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals
• Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
• Learning and coordination in the presidential primary system
• Voting as Communicating
• Strategic voting under uncertainty about the voting method
• Voting and social pressure under imperfect information
• Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory
• Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
• Strategic voting in the context of stable-matching of teams
• Coordinated democracy
• The theory of straight ticket voting
• Electoral turnout with divided opposition
• Multiple votes, ballot truncation and the two-party system: An experiment
• Strategic voting and strategic candidacy
• Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
• Do voters vote ideologically?
• A theory of voting in large elections
• Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right
• Voces populi and the art of listening
• The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas

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