Strategic voting under uncertainty about the voting method

MaRDI QIDQ5018516zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit

Publication date 20 December 2021

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.09110, http://eptcs.web.cse.unsw.edu.au/paper.cgi?TARK2019.17

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27)

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Cites work

• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• A quantitative Gobbard-Satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
• Barriers to manipulation in voting
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3434896 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2182815 (Why is no real title available?)
• Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
• Logics in Artificial Intelligence
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
• On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
• Probability, explanation, and information
• Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting.
• Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
• Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
• Strategic voting under uncertainty about the voting method
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
• Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations

Cited in

(10)

• Strategic voting in repeated referenda
• Strategic vote trading under complete information
• An analysis of random elections with large numbers of voters
• Voting theory in the Lean theorem prover
• Voting on Actions with Uncertain Outcomes
• Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals
• Strategic voting under uncertainty about the voting method
• Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
• Strategic voting in the context of stable-matching of teams
• The wasted vote phenomenon with uncertain voter population

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