Strategic voting under the plurality rule without the common knowledge assumption

MaRDI QIDQ3521423zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Issofa Moyouwou, Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga

Publication date 22 August 2008

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(12)

• \(|N|\) cheers for democracy
• Strategic voting when participation is costly
• Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
• Voting cycles, plurality rule and strategic manipulation
• Strategic voting in heterogeneous electorates: an experimental study
• Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
• Strategic voting under uncertainty about the voting method
• Manipulation of k-approval under de re knowledge
• On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
• Logics in Artificial Intelligence
• Strategic behavior under complete ignorance: approval and Condorcet-type voting rules
• Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures

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