Strategic voting and nomination
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Publication:2247944
DOI10.1007/s00355-013-0725-3zbMath1291.91064OpenAlexW2234268330MaRDI QIDQ2247944
Publication date: 30 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32200/1/MPRA_paper_32200.pdf
Related Items (3)
On parameterized complexity of liquid democracy ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Statistical evaluation of voting rules
Cites Work
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