Strategic voting and nomination
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Publication:2247944
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Cites work
- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
- Chaotic elections! A mathematician looks at voting
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
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- Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
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- Plurality rule works in three-candidate elections
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- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The scoring rules in an endogenous election
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
Cited in
(31)- Strategic voting in repeated referenda
- Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
- Voting by successive elimination and strategic candidacy
- Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules
- Electoral competition with strategic voters
- \(|N|\) cheers for democracy
- Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
- Strategic voting when participation is costly
- A diagram for analyzing ordinal voting systems
- Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections
- Voting cycles, plurality rule and strategic manipulation
- Changes that cause changes
- The two-party system under alternative voting procedures
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3847166 (Why is no real title available?)
- Binary voting with delegable proxy: an analysis of liquid democracy
- Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
- Strategic voting under the plurality rule without the common knowledge assumption
- Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals
- Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
- Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
- Strategic voting under uncertainty about the voting method
- The computational impact of partial votes on strategic voting
- On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
- Statistical evaluation of voting rules
- Strategic nomination and non-manipulable voting procedures
- Strategic voting and strategic candidacy
- Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
- On parameterized complexity of liquid democracy
- Sincere voting in models of legislative elections
- Voces populi and the art of listening
- The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
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