Statistical evaluation of voting rules
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5964648
DOI10.1007/s00355-015-0909-0zbMath1341.91057MaRDI QIDQ5964648
T. Nicolaus Tideman, Rafael Cosman, James Green-Armytage
Publication date: 1 March 2016
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0909-0
62P25: Applications of statistics to social sciences
91B12: Voting theory
91B14: Social choice
91B72: Spatial models in economics
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