Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
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Publication:1811244
DOI10.1007/S100580200073zbMATH Open1048.91040OpenAlexW1566671037MaRDI QIDQ1811244FDOQ1811244
Authors: Pierre Favardin, Dominique Lepelley, Jérôme Serais 
Publication date: 2002
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200073
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Cited In (28)
- PADUA Protocol: Strategies and Tactics
- \textit{In Silico} voting experiments
- Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
- The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
- On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
- Obvious manipulability of voting rules
- A New Binary Programming Formulation and Social Choice Property for Kemeny Rank Aggregation
- Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
- Statistical evaluation of voting rules
- Relationships between Borda voting and Zermelo ranking
- Strategic voting and nomination
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
- How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
- The Copeland method. I: Relationships and the dictionary
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
- One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
- How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
- IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules
- Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
- A new and flexible approach to the analysis of paired comparison data
- Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
- Dictatorship versus manipulability
- Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
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