Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.

DOI10.1007/S100580200073MaRDI QIDQ1811244zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pierre Favardin, Dominique Lepelley, Jérôme Serais

Publication date 2002

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200073

zbMATH Keywords

vulnerabilityvoting theorypositional voting systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(28)

• PADUA Protocol: Strategies and Tactics
• \textit{In Silico} voting experiments
• The impact of voters' preference diversity on the probability of some electoral outcomes
• Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
• On the likelihood of single-peaked preferences
• Obvious manipulability of voting rules
• A New Binary Programming Formulation and Social Choice Property for Kemeny Rank Aggregation
• Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules
• Relationships between Borda voting and Zermelo ranking
• Statistical evaluation of voting rules
• Strategic voting and nomination
• Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings
• Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average?
• How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
• On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
• On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
• The Copeland method. I: Relationships and the dictionary
• Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
• One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
• How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
• Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
• IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report
• Gains from manipulating social choice rules
• A new and flexible approach to the analysis of paired comparison data
• Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
• Dictatorship versus manipulability
• Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation

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