In Silico Voting Experiments

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_13zbMATH Open1348.91095OpenAlexW1508098558MaRDI QIDQ2829686FDOQ2829686

Jean-François Laslier

Publication date: 8 November 2016

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_13

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Budget Deficits and Redistributive Politics
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• How two-party competition treats minorities
• Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
• Distributive politics and electoral competition
• A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
• Approximation of the yolk by the LP yolk
• Proportions of profiles with a majority candidate

Cited In (6)

• Robust bounds on choosing from large tournaments
• \(k\)-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters
• Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness
• VOTE: Computer evaluation of voting techniques and candidate's chances
• Two-player fair division of indivisible items: comparison of algorithms
• Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules

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