How two-party competition treats minorities

DOI10.1007/S100580200083MaRDI QIDQ1811249zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jean-François Laslier

Publication date 2002

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200083

zbMATH Keywords

Downsian electoral competitionequilibriumPlurality game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Distributive politics and electoral competition
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• Redistribution under proportional representation
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• Electoral competition with strategic voters

Cited in

(16)

• Distributive politics and electoral competition
• \(N\)-dimensional Blotto game with heterogeneous battlefield values
• An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games
• How good is a two-party election game?
• The multiplayer Colonel Blotto game
• Waging simple wars: a complete characterization of two-battlefield Blotto equilibria
• The Colonel Blotto game
• \textit{In Silico} voting experiments
• Electoral rules and minority representation in U.S. Cities
• Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum Colonel Blotto games
• All-pay \(2\times 2\) Hex: a multibattle contest with complementarities
• Party Objectives in the “Divide a Dollar” Electoral Competition
• Online learning in budget-constrained dynamic Colonel Blotto games
• The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game
• Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto games
• Can the majority lose the election?

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