Divide and rule: redistribution in a model with differentiated candidates

DOI10.1007/s00199-016-0967-2zbMath1404.91081OpenAlexW2297971268WikidataQ59614891 ScholiaQ59614891MaRDI QIDQ523058

Dimitrios Xefteris, Konstantinos Matakos

Publication date: 20 April 2017

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-0967-2

zbMATH Keywords

inequalitytaxationidentityredistributive politicsdifferentiated candidateswithin-group homogeneity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (3)

Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets ⋮ Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates ⋮ Inequality, redistribution and the rise of outsider candidates

Cites Work

• Political competition between differentiated candidates
• Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space
• ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule
• Electoral competition in 2-dimensional ideology space with unidimensional commitment
• The binary policy model
• Inequality and growth: what can the data say?
• Will democracy engender equality?
• A model of political parties
• The political economy of redistribution under democracy
• Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform"
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• Distributive Politics and the Costs of Centralization
• A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
• A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem*

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