Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.12.008zbMATH Open1242.91151OpenAlexW1796613186MaRDI QIDQ423710FDOQ423710
Authors: Enriqueta Aragonès, Dimitrios Xefteris 
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.12.008
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Cites Work
- A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points
- Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
- Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information
- On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence
Cited In (14)
- Inequality, redistribution and the rise of outsider candidates
- Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
- Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules
- On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence
- Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
- Spatial competition on 2-dimensional markets and networks when consumers don't always go to the closest firm
- Intensity valence
- Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members
- Empirical foundation of valence using Aldrich-McKelvey scaling
- Spatial electoral competition with a probabilistically favored candidate
- Mixed strategy equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate: a comment
- The hedgehog's dilemma
- Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters
- Divide and rule: redistribution in a model with differentiated candidates
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