Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information
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(17)- Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
- Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates
- Hiding information in electoral competition.
- Spatial electoral competition with a probabilistically favored candidate
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- Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets
- Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
- Political motivations and electoral competition: equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence
- Pandering and electoral competition
- Power sharing and electoral equilibrium
- Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space
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- Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty
- On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence
- Ideological consistency and valence
- Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates
- Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
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