Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information

DOI10.1007/3-540-27295-X_4MaRDI QIDQ5486924zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Enriqueta Aragonès, Thomas R. Palfrey

Publication date 18 September 2006

Published in Social Choice and Strategic Decisions (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-x_4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates
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Cites work

• Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate

Cited in

(16)

• Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates
• Spatial electoral competition with a probabilistically favored candidate
• Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
• Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
• Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space
• Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets
• Hiding information in electoral competition.
• Political motivations and electoral competition: equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence
• On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence
• Pandering and electoral competition
• Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
• Power sharing and electoral equilibrium
• ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule
• Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality
• Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty
• Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates

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