Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information

DOI10.1007/3-540-27295-X_4zbMATH Open1255.91082OpenAlexW2151450335MaRDI QIDQ5486924FDOQ5486924

Authors: Enriqueta Aragonès, Thomas R. Palfrey 

Publication date: 18 September 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Strategic Decisions (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27295-x_4

Recommendations

• Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates
• A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
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• Electoral competition under imperfect information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
• Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate

Cited In (16)

• Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
• Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty
• Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives
• Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets
• Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
• Pandering and electoral competition
• Candidate quality in a Downsian model with a continuous policy space
• On the nature of equilibria in a Downsian model with candidate valence
• Hiding information in electoral competition.
• Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates
• Political motivations and electoral competition: equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence
• Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality
• Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates
• Spatial electoral competition with a probabilistically favored candidate
• Power sharing and electoral equilibrium
• ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule

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