Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.04.005zbMath1154.91380MaRDI QIDQ1001819

Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Faruk Gul

Publication date: 19 February 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.04.005

zbMATH Keywords

information aggregation; electoral competition; voter ignorance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

91F10: History, political science

Related Items

RETROSPECTIVE VOTING AND PARTY POLARIZATION, Information and targeted spending, Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections, Political competition between differentiated candidates, Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility, The binary policy model, The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences, Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers, Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting, Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy

Cites Work

• Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates
• Sequential elections with limited information. A formal analysis
• Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
• Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
• Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
• The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information