Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.04.005zbMath1154.91380OpenAlexW2074183620MaRDI QIDQ1001819

Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Faruk Gul

Publication date: 19 February 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.04.005

zbMATH Keywords

information aggregationelectoral competitionvoter ignorance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items

Political competition between differentiated candidates ⋮ Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy ⋮ Information structures and information aggregation in threshold equilibria in elections ⋮ Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers ⋮ Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting ⋮ Information aggregation failure in a model of social mobility ⋮ The binary policy model ⋮ The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences ⋮ RETROSPECTIVE VOTING AND PARTY POLARIZATION ⋮ Information and targeted spending

Cites Work

• Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates
• Sequential elections with limited information. A formal analysis
• Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
• Candidates with policy preferences: A dynamic model
• Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
• The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Electoral Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information