Sequential elections with limited information. A formal analysis
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1079459
DOI10.1007/BF00433535zbMath0597.90008OpenAlexW1491571773MaRDI QIDQ1079459
Peter C. Ordeshook, Richard D. McKelvey
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00433535
incomplete information modelone-dimensional policy spacesequence of electionsstationary rational expectations equilibrium
Related Items
Sequential elections with limited information. A formal analysis, Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources, Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework, On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness, Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters, Political engineering: optimizing a U.S. Presidential candidate's platform
Cites Work