Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
A one-dimensional model of two candidate elections under asymmetric information is theoretically developed and experimentally tested. Candidates do not know voter utility functions, and most voters are uninformed about candidate policy positions. A fulfilled expectations equilibrium is defined, using poll and endorsement data as information sources. It is proved that with any positive fraction of informed voters, any equilibrium extracts all available information: all participants - voters and candidates alike - act as if they were fully informed. For fixed candidate strategies, a dynamic is given for convergence to voter equilibrium, and this process is shown to imply a bandwagon effect.
- Sequential elections with limited information. A formal analysis
- Elections with limited information: A multidimensional model
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
- A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- A note on 'fulfilled expectations' equilibria
- An Introduction to the Theory of Rational Expectations Under Asymmetric Information
- Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
- Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations in a Sequence of Markets
- Further results on the informational efficiency of competitive stock markets
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
- Sequential elections with limited information. A formal analysis
- Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
- Sequential elections with limited information. A formal analysis
- Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
- Elections with limited information: A multidimensional model
- Nondictatorial social welfare functions with different discrimination structures
- Social learning in a common interest voting game
- Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting.
- Polling in a proportional representation system
- Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
- Elections under biased candidate endorsements -- an experimental study
- Pre-election polling and third party candidates
- Modelling election dynamics and the impact of disinformation
- Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
- Introduction: Special issue of ``Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Richard D. McKelvey
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information
- Lobbying: influence under micro-targeting
- Repeated Downsian electoral competition
- A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
This page was built for publication: Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1083000)
