Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90079-1zbMATH Open0603.90008OpenAlexW2033206242MaRDI QIDQ1083000FDOQ1083000
Authors: Richard D. McKelvey, Peter C. Ordeshook 
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/81973/
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Cites Work
- Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price Expectations in a Sequence of Markets
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
- A note on 'fulfilled expectations' equilibria
- Further results on the informational efficiency of competitive stock markets
- An Introduction to the Theory of Rational Expectations Under Asymmetric Information
- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- Sequential elections with limited information. A formal analysis
- Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
Cited In (19)
- Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters
- Elections under biased candidate endorsements -- an experimental study
- Pre-election polling and third party candidates
- Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
- A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
- Social learning in a common interest voting game
- Repeated Downsian electoral competition
- Sequential elections with limited information. A formal analysis
- Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
- Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting.
- Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
- Modelling election dynamics and the impact of disinformation
- Introduction: Special issue of ``Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Richard D. McKelvey
- Nondictatorial social welfare functions with different discrimination structures
- Polling in a proportional representation system
- Monopoly Agenda Control and Asymmetric Information
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
- Elections with limited information: A multidimensional model
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