Repeated Downsian electoral competition
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Publication:863396
DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0046-1zbMATH Open1118.91017OpenAlexW2014062452MaRDI QIDQ863396FDOQ863396
Authors: John Duggan, Mark Fey
Publication date: 26 January 2007
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0046-1
Recommendations
Folk theoreminfinitely repeated version of the Downsian model of electionsMedian voter theoremSubgame perfect equilibrium
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
- Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
- Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
Cited In (7)
- Ideological versus Downsian political competition
- Two-party competition with persistent policies
- Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
- A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
- Representative voting games
- A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
- Inequality and political consensus
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