A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0090-6zbMath1158.91342OpenAlexW2049102645WikidataQ124801135 ScholiaQ124801135MaRDI QIDQ2432490

John Duggan, Jeffrey S. Banks

Publication date: 25 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79716/

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Dynamic games (91A25) Social choice (91B14)

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