A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2432490
Recommendations
Cites work
- Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions
- Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
- General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1351867 (Why is no real title available?)
- Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
- Introdction to Measure and Probability
- On the existence of equilibria to Bayesian games with non-finite type and action spaces
- Repeated Downsian electoral competition
- Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
- Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
- The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
Cited in
(22)- Strategic behaviour and a notion of ex ante efficiency in a voting model
- Some properties of paths in the dynamic voting problem
- An extension of Bowen's dynamic voting rule to many dimensions
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
- A lemma in open sequential voting by veto
- Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy?
- On the invariance of a mean voter theorem
- Primaries with strategic voters: trading off electability and ideology
- Learning about challengers
- A bargaining model of endogenous procedures
- Rationalizability in large games
- Brexit: a comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options
- A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings
- Consistent @d-Relative Majority Equilibria
- Two-party competition with persistent policies
- Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems
- Dynamic legislative policy making
- Losing money to make money: the benefits of redistribution in collective bargaining in sports
- Provoking the opposition
- Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
- Repeated Downsian electoral competition
- Dynamically consistent voting rules
This page was built for publication: A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2432490)
