A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0090-6zbMATH Open1158.91342OpenAlexW2049102645WikidataQ124801135 ScholiaQ124801135MaRDI QIDQ2432490FDOQ2432490

Authors: Jeffrey S. Banks, John Duggan 

Publication date: 25 October 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79716/

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Dynamic games (91A25) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
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• The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
• Introdction to Measure and Probability
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
• Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions
• Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
• On the existence of equilibria to Bayesian games with non-finite type and action spaces
• Repeated Downsian electoral competition

Cited In (20)

• Two-party competition with persistent policies
• Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems
• On the invariance of a mean voter theorem
• Some properties of paths in the dynamic voting problem
• Citizens or lobbies: who controls policy?
• Repeated Downsian electoral competition
• Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
• Losing money to make money: the benefits of redistribution in collective bargaining in sports
• Consistent @d-Relative Majority Equilibria
• Dynamically consistent voting rules
• Brexit: a comparison of dynamic voting games with irreversible options
• Strategic behaviour and a notion of ex ante efficiency in a voting model
• A lemma in open sequential voting by veto
• Primaries with strategic voters: trading off electability and ideology
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• A bargaining model of endogenous procedures
• Learning about challengers
• Dynamic legislative policy making
• A Solution Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings
• Rationalizability in large games

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