A lemma in open sequential voting by veto
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Publication:1680112
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.07.003zbMath1415.91115OpenAlexW2736432792WikidataQ125056461 ScholiaQ125056461MaRDI QIDQ1680112
Natalia M. Novikova, Irina I. Pospelova
Publication date: 22 November 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.07.003
hierarchical gamesrational choicesequential voting by vetointuitive rationalityorder of votingsophisticated equilibrium
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Voting theory (91B12) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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Cites Work
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