Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
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Publication:1159118
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(81)90076-4zbMath0473.90007MaRDI QIDQ1159118
Publication date: 1981
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/375.pdf
Nash equilibria; noncooperative game; incomplete information; prudence; sophistication; voting strategy; equilibrium vote; prudent maximin type behavior; sophisticated behaviour; voting scheme
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