Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
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Publication:4196276
DOI10.2307/1913838zbMath0408.90093OpenAlexW2062339879MaRDI QIDQ4196276
Leonid Hurwicz, David Schmeidler
Publication date: 1978
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54834
Nash EquilibriumVotingSocial ChoiceN-Person Noncooperative GameAcceptable And Nondictatorial Outcome FunctionsStrict Profile
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