Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
- An axiomatization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution when the feasible sets can be finite
- An incentive-compatible Condorcet jury theorem
- Approval voting and scoring rules with common values
- Approval voting: three examples
- Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives
- Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
- Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
- Efficient compromising
- Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
- Final-Offer Arbitration
- Finite alternating-move arbitration schemes and the equal area solution
- Implementation with evidence
- Intermediate preferences and Rawlsian arbitration rules
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- On the fairness of random procedures
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- On the rule of \(k\) names
- One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Pitfalls in the theory of fairness
- Reason-based choice: A bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability
- Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
- Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- The basic approval voting game
- The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
- Uniform expected utility criteria for decision making under ignorance or objective ambiguity
- When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
Cited in
(6)
This page was built for publication: Bargaining through approval
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q745006)
