Bargaining through approval

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.06.015zbMATH Open1368.91080OpenAlexW2243533746MaRDI QIDQ745006FDOQ745006

Authors: Matías Núñez, Jean-François Laslier 

Publication date: 12 October 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2014-06.pdf

Recommendations

• Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
• The basic approval voting game
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting
• Strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting
• Who Wins and Loses Under Approval Voting? An Analysis of Large Elections

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyapproval votingtwo-agentspartial honesty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• Title not available (Why is that?)
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Cited In (6)

• Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
• Bargaining with reasonable aspirations
• A solution to the two-person implementation problem
• Negotiation strategies for agents with ordinal preferences: theoretical analysis and human study
• Negotiating using rewards
• Threshold voting leads to type-revelation

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