Implementation with evidence
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Publication:4683689
DOI10.3982/TE723zbMath1397.91190OpenAlexW3035787644MaRDI QIDQ4683689
Olivier Tercieux, Navin Kartik
Publication date: 21 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te723
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