A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.008zbMath1397.91188OpenAlexW2822981468MaRDI QIDQ1787988

Makoto Hagiwara

Publication date: 8 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.008

zbMATH Keywords

double implementationunanimitysimple mechanismsemi-social-responsibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Motives and implementation with rights structures, Double implementation without no-veto-power

Cites Work

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