A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.07.008MaRDI QIDQ1787988zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Makoto Hagiwara

Publication date 8 October 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.07.008

zbMATH Keywords

double implementationsemi-social-responsibilitysimple mechanismunanimity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
• Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
• Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria
• Double implementation without no-veto-power
• Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies

Cites work

• Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria
• Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
• Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
• Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Implementation with evidence
• Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
• Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms

Cited in

(4)

• Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
• Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
• Motives and implementation with rights structures
• Double implementation without no-veto-power

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