Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
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Publication:665086
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3504639 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- A crash course in implementation theory
- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
- Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees.
- Feasible and Continuous Implementation
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
- Implementation with evidence
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism
- On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
- Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Strategic market games: an introduction.
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
Cited in
(59)- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Nash implementation with little communication
- Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
- Direct implementation with evidence
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- Implementation theory
- Process manipulation in unique implementation
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
- Privacy in implementation
- Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
- Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Implementation with evidence
- Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Implementation via rights structures
- Implementation with partial provability
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
- Honesty in discrete, nonlocal and randomly position structured fragmentation model with unbounded rates
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Motives and implementation with rights structures
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium
- Behavioral strong implementation
- On the implementation of the median
- Bargaining through approval
- Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
- Complexity and repeated implementation
- Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
- Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents
- Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment
- Conformity in voting
- Obvious manipulations
- Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- Information disclosure with many alternatives
- Robust coalitional implementation
- Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
- Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450018 (Why is no real title available?)
- Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information
- Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
- Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
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