Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
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Publication:665086
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.07.006zbMATH Open1278.91053OpenAlexW1966348900WikidataQ109043315 ScholiaQ109043315MaRDI QIDQ665086FDOQ665086
Authors: Bhaskar Dutta, Arunava Sen 
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/271188
Recommendations
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- On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
Cites Work
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Cited In (59)
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Implementation theory
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- Process manipulation in unique implementation
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
- Privacy in implementation
- Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
- Equilibria of plurality voting: lazy and truth-biased voters
- Implementation with evidence
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Implementation via rights structures
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Implementation with partial provability
- On partially honest Nash implementation in private good economies with restricted domains: a sufficient condition
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Motives and implementation with rights structures
- Honesty in discrete, nonlocal and randomly position structured fragmentation model with unbounded rates
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- On the implementation of the median
- A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium
- Bargaining through approval
- Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- Securely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
- Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules
- Complexity and repeated implementation
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
- Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents
- Conformity in voting
- Obvious manipulations
- Full implementation of rank-dependent prizes
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- Information disclosure with many alternatives
- Robust coalitional implementation
- Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
- Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
- Nash implementation with little communication
- Direct implementation with evidence
- Behavioral strong implementation
- Mean versus median voting in multi-dimensional budget allocation problems. A laboratory experiment
- Implementation with a sympathizer
- Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
- Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
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