Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
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Publication:665086
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.006zbMath1278.91053OpenAlexW1966348900WikidataQ109043315 ScholiaQ109043315MaRDI QIDQ665086
Publication date: 5 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/271188
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