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Publication:4003461
zbMath0925.90016MaRDI QIDQ4003461
Publication date: 18 September 1992
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
decision theoryimplementationcooperative game theoryeffectivity functionpower structuresocial choice rule
Cooperative games (91A12) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Social choice (91B14)
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