Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
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Publication:857972
DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0140-0zbMATH Open1142.91427OpenAlexW4213413545MaRDI QIDQ857972FDOQ857972
Authors: Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters 
Publication date: 5 January 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp308.pdf
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Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Properties of consistent voting systems
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Equally distributed correspondences
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
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- The Marriage Problem
- Consistent Voting Systems
- On strong representations of games by social choice functions
- On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
- Representations of simple games by social choice functions
- The capacity of a committee
- Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions
- The structure of exactly strongly consistent social choice functions
Cited In (5)
- Extensions of the Young and Levenglick result about the inconsistency of Condorcet voting correspondences
- Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
- Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
- A universal voting system based on the potential method
- On strongly consistent social choice functions
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