Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
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Publication:857972
DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0140-0zbMath1142.91427MaRDI QIDQ857972
Bezalel Peleg, H. J. M. Peters
Publication date: 5 January 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp308.pdf
91B12: Voting theory
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