Representations of simple games by social choice functions
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Cites work
- Consistent Voting Systems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078998 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
- Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
- Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
- The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
Cited in
(17)- On strong representations of games by social choice functions
- The capacity of a committee
- Neutral veto correspondences with a continuum of alternatives
- A theory of coalition formation in committees
- Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions
- The strategy-proof social choice functions
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium
- Weakly implementable social choice rules
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for l-stability of games in constitutional form
- Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules
- Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey
- Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
- The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
- Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
- On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions
- Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice
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