Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey
Summary: We survey the results on representations of committees and constitutions by game forms that possess some kind of equilibrium strategies for each profile of preferences of the players. The survey is restricted to discrete models, that is, we deal with finitely many players and alternatives. No prior knowledge of social choice is assumed: As far as definitions are concerned, the paper is self-contained. Section 2 supplies the necessary general tools for the rest of the paper. Each definition is followed by a simple (but nontrivial) example. In Section 3 we give a complete account of representations of committees (proper and monotonic simple games), by exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions. We start with Peleg's representations of weak games, and then provide a complete and detailed account of Holzman's solution of the representation problem for simple games without veto players. In Section 4 we deal with representations of constitutions by game forms. Following Gärdenfors we model a constitution by a monotonic and superadditive effectivity function. We fully characterize the representations for three kinds of equilibrium: Nash equilibrium; acceptable equilibrium (Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium); and strong Nash equilibrium. We conclude in Section 5 with a report on two recent works on representations of constitutions under incomplete information.
- Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
- Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice
- Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
- Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
- Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization
- Binary effectivity rules
- Consistent Voting Systems
- Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Counter-threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes
- Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
- Game Theory
- Game theory. Translated from the Hebrew by Ziv Hellman and edited by Mike Borns
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- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
- On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions
- On strong representations of games by social choice functions
- Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
- Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization
- Representations of simple games by social choice functions
- Social choice and individual values
- Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The capacity of a committee
- The structure of exactly strongly consistent social choice functions
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
- On strong representations of games by social choice functions
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
- Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
- Editorial. Introduction to the special issue political games: strategy, persuasion, and learning
- A qualitative theory of conflict resolution and political compromise
- The dynamic transformation of political systems through social contract: A game theoretic approach
- Game representation -- code form
- Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
- Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
- Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice
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