Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey

DOI10.3390/g8040046zbMath1410.91208OpenAlexW2767160848MaRDI QIDQ1656983

Bezalel Peleg, Ron Holzman

Publication date: 13 August 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040046

zbMATH Keywords

representationequilibriumincomplete informationsimple gamesocial choice functioncommitteeeffectivity functiongame formconstitution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Social choice (91B14)

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A qualitative theory of conflict resolution and political compromise

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