Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
- Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
- Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
- Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz
- The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
- On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Fully sincere voting
- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
- A dictatorial domain for monotone social choice functions
- Another induction proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
- Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
- Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
- Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
- Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences
- New problems in the general choice theory
- A note on nondictatorial conditions for choice mechanisms
- The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Bilateral monopoly with imperfect information
- Strategic behaviour and a notion of ex ante efficiency in a voting model
- The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
- Control of social choice systems
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- Symmetry, voting, and social choice
- To vote or not to vote: What is the quota?
- Bargaining and regulation with asymmetric information about demand and supply
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- A new informational base for social choice
- Manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness
- Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
- Double deception: Two against one in three-person games
- The strategy-proof social choice functions
- Stable voting schemes
- Aggregation of preferences: a review
- Length and cycle equalization
- A control-theoretic view on incentives
- Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats
- Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
- Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons
- Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
- Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
- The categorical approach to social choice theory
- No minimally reasonable collective-choice process can be strategy-proof
- Individual strategy and manipulation of issues
- Dominant strategies and restricted ballots with variable electorate
- Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
- Restricted preferences and strategyproofness of singlevalued social decision functions
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution social choice functions: An impossibility theorem
- Strategic equilibria and decisive set structures for social choice mechanisms
- Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium
- Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
- Calculus and extensions of Arrow's theorem
- Impediments to universal preference-based default theories
- Implementation via backward induction
- Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules
- Weakly implementable social choice rules
- Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
- Manipulability of choice aggregations
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Independence of nonfeasible alternatives, and independence of nonoptimal alternatives
- Distortion of preferences, income distribution, and the case for a linear income tax
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Stability of social choices in infinitely large societies
- How relevant are irrelevant alternatives?
- Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
- Rights exercising and a Pareto-consistent libertarian claim
- Sophisticated voting with information for two voting functions
- Manipulation of social decision functions
- Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
- Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules
- Representations of simple games by social choice functions
- Manipulation of social choice rules by strategic nomination of candidates
- A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
- Incentive compatibility and incomplete information
- A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
- Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
- Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
- Quality of group decisions
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Repeated implementation
- Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies
- On ring formation in auctions
- Decomposable effectivity functions
- Strategic play and adaptive learning in the sealed-bid bargaining mechanism
- Consensus rules for committee elections
- Incentive-compatibility in large games
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Voting under constraints
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Between liberalism and democracy.
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