Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz

DOI10.1007/S10058-008-0071-6MaRDI QIDQ1022385zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Roger B. Myerson

Publication date 22 June 2009

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0071-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

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Cites work

• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior

Cited in

(3)

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• Revisiting the Institutional Approach to Herbrand’s Theorem
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6296808 (Why is no real title available?)

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