scientific article
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3220033
zbMath0556.90004MaRDI QIDQ3220033
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Eric S. Maskin
Publication date: 1982
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
social choicemoral hazardadverse selectionprincipalpublic projectplannertheory of incentivestheory of teams
Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-02) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (20)
The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium ⋮ A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments ⋮ Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms and perfect competition ⋮ Stopping agents from ``cheating ⋮ The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project ⋮ Deriving consensus in multiagent systems ⋮ Multi-level programming and conflict resolution ⋮ Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Inequality-averse principal, exogenous budget, and second-best public-goods provision ⋮ Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials ⋮ Limitations of the revelation principle ⋮ Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs ⋮ Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers ⋮ Contract design and bargaining power ⋮ Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods ⋮ Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results ⋮ Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project ⋮ On incentive problems ⋮ On the difficulty of eliciting summary information
This page was built for publication: