scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3887382

From MaRDI portal
Publication:3220033





[For the entire collection see Zbl 0513.00016.] The authors explain in the introduction the subject matter of the theory of incentives and its distinction from the theory of teams and social choice theory. In the theory of incentives a planner or principal faces problems which stem from the lack of coincidence of his objectives with those of the agents. For example, problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are involved. The authors present a formal model and show that the models discussed in the literature are special cases of this general model. As an illustration of the theory the authors discuss a model for the selection of a public project. Both authors have made a number of contributions to the theory of incentives. The paper will be particularly valuable to researchers in this area and should be read in conjunction with Chapter 1 and 3 in this volume.




Cited in
(29)








This page was built for publication:

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3220033)