scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3887382

MaRDI QIDQ3220033zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jean-Jacques Laffont, Eric Maskin

Publication date 1982

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionmoral hazardplannerprincipalpublic projectsocial choicetheory of incentivestheory of teams

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-02) Social choice (91B14)

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